Ron Fouchier's Vial

Global health security dangling perilously in the hands of a virologist

Whenever I hear the word “bioweapon”, I cringe.

I cringe not just because the concept terrifies me to the core, but also because lately it’s common to hear folk calling research enhancing potential pandemic pathogens or gain of function research of concern (GOFROC) as akin to “bioweapons development”.

Calling GOFROC “bioweapons development” in contemporary debates is a fairly intense rhetorical tool, and perhaps a legal effort, to connect research enhancing potential pandemic pathogens to the language of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a treaty the US and other nations have signed committing to not develop biological weapons. If one were to succeed in arguing GOFROC is bioweapons development, then such work would violate governments’ commitments to avoid the proliferation of biological weapons. If GOFROC was socially or legally considered bioweapons development, then GOFROC would be considered illegal and the risks incurred by this risky line of research would no longer keep us up at night.

Tools, including rhetorical tools, can be useful, but we should evaluate the efficacy of their use and opt for the most effective tools where possible. I agree with the end goal of this rhetorical strategy – reducing the risk of pandemics caused by research, especially research enhancing dangerous pathogens - but I believe the rhetorical means may be too inflammatory and less effective than other approaches to this problem. Perhaps there’s another rhetorical tool in the toolkit, one less weaponizable and inflammatory and more unifying, pragmatic, and capable of helping us achieve the biosafety we desire.

What is a weapon?

In elementary school, I saw a buddy get stabbed by a screwdriver. In middle school, one of my close friends got in a fight and the other dude grabbed a brick and gave my friend a life-altering traumatic brain injury. In high school, I saw a guy get stabbed by a pen.

I’ve witnessed screwdrivers, bricks, pens, and other tools repurposed as weapons in my life, lives altered by everyday objects.

I’ve also used screwdrivers to turn screws or hammer nails. I’ve used pens to write or weight down papers.

Whether or not something is a tool or a weapon is not clear, although it is clear that some things are more easily weaponized than others. We could philosophize that somehow the device must be capable of producing enough force to puncture or rupture tissues or enable enough disruption to physiological functions to disrupt critical systems in a human body. By these criteria, a long list of household objects can be (and have been) used as weapons, including soft things like pillows and plastic given their ability to disrupt respiration.

Along this line of thought, pathogens instantly fall into the category of things that can be weaponized. Whether or not the pathogen’s transmissibility or virulence is enhanced in the course of research, pathogens infect cells or colonize our bodies, and the way pathogens hijack our body can disrupt physiological functions (if they didn’t disrupt physiological functions, they wouldn’t be pathogenic agents but rather commensal or mutualistic ones). In this sense, enhancing potential pandemic pathogens would be weapons development only if sharpening a screwdriver were also considered weapons development – the thing was already capable of being weaponized prior to enhancement.

Notice how many words we’ve had to say & triggering, hair-raising concepts discuss just because we used the term “weapon”? This is where my mind goes when I hear the term “bioweapon”, and I think there are shorter rhetorical paths we can take.

Philosophizing about whether something is or isn’t a weapon, as we’re prone to do when we bring out the term “bioweapon”, can go in circles and devolve into absurd (albeit comically absurd) philosophical discussions about pillows and pens. Personally, I think a weapon requires a user, and it only becomes a weapon in some formal sense if the user intends or postures to use it as such, but also, personally, I’m worried about global health security and want to find practical solutions to advance this issue. I’d rather avoid a lofty philosophical discussion about weapons because there are some serious risks we need to manage and little to gain from floating in the clouds, wondering what a weapon is and disagreeing platonic ideals versus real-world applications of a pillow.

More concretely, once you’ve seen somebody get stabbed with pen and carried out of high school on a stretcher, or once you’ve had a friend get bricked, it becomes traumatically clear that humans are not all angels.

Once you’ve heard about someone with access to anthrax sending anthrax spores in the mail, as we heard in the 2001 anthrax attacks, it becomes terrifyingly clear that scientists, too, are not all angels. Once we acknowledge that humans, including scientists, are not angels, we begin the both practical and philosophical journey of devising governance models that mitigate the risks from the negligence or malice of those who are not angels.

Rather than “bioweapons”, I prefer a simpler rhetorical tool, and one that truly keeps me up at night: “Mad Scientist”.

The imperfection of scientists, not just in their potential for laboratory accidents but also their capacity for negligence and malice, is a better and universally agreeable foundation from which we can all build our discussions on GOFROC. Let’s consider, for the sake of both practicality and philosophy, a scientist named Ron Fouchier.

Ron Fouchier’s Vial

In 2011, Ron Fouchier enhanced the transmissibility of highly pathogenic avian influenza in ferrets, creating a novel biological agent he then presumably stored in a vial somewhere in the Netherlands. If Ron’s virus were to escape from a lab, whether through an accident, negligence, or malice, it could conceivably kill millions or possibly even billions of people, devastating global human civilization and altering the course of human history. And yes, it is “Ron’s Virus” because he created it, he could patent it if he wanted to, it is his Frankenstein Virus, and he has possession of it.

How secure is that vial? Who has access to it? Are they happy?

Is Ron happy?

Imagine if the guy who stabbed somebody with a pen was working in Ron’s lab. Imagine if Ron were to be embroiled in some conflict with other scientists who felt his work unethical, regulators eager to seize his vial, or any manner of normal human affairs that can drive people insane. Before the pen-stabbing, the student was a normal high schooler, living their normal high school life in the school-to-prison pipeline we grew up in. Suddenly, a dramatic encounter occurred, insults exchanged, conflict escalated, and a bloodthirsty brawl ensued, turning a normal high school student into a pen-stabbing maniac (or so we cast him after the fact).

Perhaps Ron is happy today. Will Ron be happy tomorrow?

If you haven’t seen human conflict escalate to shocking degrees of violence, it can be hard to appreciate how tenuous an individual’s adherence to our social contract and norms can be, especially in the face of adversity and conflict. We hear about school shootings, mass stabbings, trucks plowing through crowds, suicide bombers, and more, and often we look back on the person or group involved and see them as hateful as if we could identify that easily ahead of time. Yet, these incidents continue to occur precisely because we can’t identify ahead of time who’s happy and who’s unhappy or what series of events will lead an otherwise happy-seeming person today to commit unspeakable acts of violence tomorrow.

The public perceives scientists as a fairly happy and virtuous bunch, or so scientists like to tell themselves. However, some studies suggest over 50% of graduate students suffer depression.  Other studies suggest graduate students are 6 times more likely to suffer depression than the general population. It’s not just graduate students – in 2023, a professor went on a shooting spree at UNLV. In 2016, a professor stabbed a colleague and was deemed not guilty by reason of insanity. Not only are scientists not angels, but studies suggests scientists may have a higher rate of mental illness than the general population.

Now, let’s go back to that vial in Ron Fouchier’s lab.

Is the person handling that vial happy today? Will they be tomorrow?

Is Ron Fouchier happy today? Could this article make him unhappy tomorrow?

Has anybody even done a background check & psychological evaluation of Ron Fouchier?

Is there nothing that could coerce Ron, or put him under duress, and affect his decision-making processes as a civilization-ending vial rests delicately in his hands?

Is it wise to put the fate of civilization and global health security into Ron’s hands?

While Ron is famous, the rest of the people in the world outside that lab, far from the vial, are unaffected by the research involving that vial. We have gained nothing from the publications and internalized accolades that Ron Fouchier received for Ron Fouchier’s work. There have been no externalized pharmaceutical or scientific benefits from his work, yet every person in the world is exposed to the externalized risks of a pandemic that could disrupt human civilization and alter the course of human history should Ron, or anyone working with Ron, be unhappy one day.

If Ron were mad, even just temporarily so, could he tip his vial?

Whether or not the vial is a weapon is less important than the fact that gain of function research of concern leads to the proliferation of civilization-altering vials like the ones in Ron Fouchier’s hands. As surely as someone with access to anthrax was able to terrorize the world by sending spores in envelopes, someone with access to Ron Fouchier’s vials, including Ron Fouchier himself, could some day take a turn for the worse and become negligent or malicious. The vial Ron Fouchier created is like a machine gun with billions of lung-seeking bullets that could find itself in the hands of an angry child, or a mad scientist acting like a child, and empower them to cause catastrophic harm.

Whether or not that vial is a weapon is less relevant than the risks we all face by trusting humanity to never be mad and allow them to have such powerful, dangerous vials in their freezers, absent oversight mechanisms and regulations commensurate with the risks we all face from the vial.

The general public has more votes than Ron. Don’t let scientists tell you otherwise - the general public has more authority on this issue than Ron himself.

We could take his vial & destroy it, like hobbits marching Gollum’s ring to the fires of Mount Doom to save all of Middle Earth from the mad wizard who made the ring.

Ron Fouchier’s Vial. Image generated by DeepAI

We have the power and the right to determine what systems of laws, norms, and oversight we should put in place to mitigate catastrophic risks. The scientific community has to acknowledge a certain conflict of interest in this matter – scientists who conduct this research benefit from the research because it helps them get publications, funding, and fame. The humans regulated in any regulation of GOFROC are us scientists, and while it’s natural to bristle at being told what to do, in this case I encourage scientists to decenter themselves and focus on the world at large, let alone the rest of the scientific community that doesn’t screw around with Ron Fouchier’s vials.

The Unbearable Liabilities of Ron Fouchier’s Vial

The world at large wants tangible benefits from the science they fund. The rest of the scientific community wants to uphold the reputation of science as a process, and the scientific community as a community, capable of delivering the tangible gains the rest of the world wants. If anything negligent or malicious were to occur in the handling of Ron Fouchier’s vial, it would devastate the reputation of the scientific community, it could devastate the world at large, and any country found liable for funding or approving the creation of that vial could, in theory, face liabilities no country can bear.

It is orders of magnitude easier to create a new disease than it is to create, manufacture, and distribute effective therapeutics for new diseases, yet this asymmetry is never considered with each new vial we create. Unless Ron Fouchier has a way of protecting the world from the thing he creates before creating it, especially in a way that doesn’t enrich Ron Fouchier (e.g. he can’t have a patent on the vaccine to cure a disease he later creates), I can’t fathom any reason why the rest of the world should allow Ron Fouchier to make that vial. Countries navigating delicate geopolitical circumstances and managing tight budgets are unwise to fund the creation of Ron Fouchier’s vial given the geopolitical nightmare it could create, the unbearable liabilities they could face, and the enduring damage to the country’s global standing that could occur should the person with the vial not be an angel.

The fate of the Netherlands, for example, may rest entirely in the hands of Ron, with an almost zero probability that Ron saves the country but a nonzero probability Ron could lead his entire country to ruin.

By allowing GOFROC, especially by funding GOFROC, countries are setting a global norm that it’s okay to make not just one, but thousands of vials like the one in Ron Fouchier’s freezer in the Netherlands, and we are introducing similar unbearable liabilities in universities, states, and countries around the globe. Yoshihiro Kawaoka has his own vials in Michigan. Ralph Baric’s got vials in North Carolina. Shi Zhengli’s got vials in Wuhan. Christian Drosten’s got vials in Germany.

By normalizing the research practice of enhancing potential pandemic pathogens, we have brought about a proliferation of exceedingly dangerous vials. After a point, we can no longer keep track of all the vials in the world, and so not only do we have to worry about the one person holding Ron Fouchier’s 2011 vial today, we have to worry about the mental health & virtue of every person around the world who has access to similar vials, and every malign actor who might seek access to those vials by pretending to be an angel just to get their hands on the vial.

The problem with research enhancing potential pandemic pathogens is not the pathogens, it is the humans. Because humans are not perfect, it’s important that we place restrictions on the tools that enable imperfect humans to cause unspeakable harm.

Scientists are granted a unique privilege in our society allowing them to procure all manners of materials, chemicals, and biological agents that would be illegal in the hands of a civilian, yet even among scientists we have to draw lines to restrict access to and use of materials, chemicals, and biological agents capable of causing enormous harm. If you’re a chemist, I’m assuming you can order or purify large volumes of the precursors to methamphetamine, but you are not allowed to manufacture the drug (or, presumably, there is a nightmare of paperwork and oversight required to ensure not a single gram goes unaccounted for).

We need strong regulations on the procurement, operation, and maintenance of BSL facilities and their staff, and legal requirements that pathogens be worked with only in the correct facility.

We need systems that ensure full transparency to help us keep track of all the vials, and not approve the creation of a single drop containing enhanced pathogens unless it is authorized by an official accountable to the public. I might even encourage allowing funders to face liabilities if the research they fund causes harm – such liabilities could invite funders to truly consider whether or not the research is worth the risk. Additionally, if liabilities from a research project could not possibly be paid by the researcher & funder conducting the work, perhaps that work should not be legal to prevent the scenario where an accident leads to unbearable liabilities guaranteeing unattainable justice for those harmed.

For anyone handling infectious agents capable of harming anyone other than themselves, we ought to consider background checks and regular psychological evaluations like we require for some guns or for airline pilots. I would be instantly in favor of virologists working in BSL3-4 labs requiring the sorts of stringent screening we’ve required for airline pilots after we saw on September 11, 2001 the harm and geopolitical crises a few rogue airline pilots could cause. It’s an oversight that we didn’t learn the same thing from the 2001 anthrax attacks that same yea. It’s deeply concerning that we’re not learning the same thing from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Vote To Regulate Ron

The researchers and funders who’ve done the most to bend truth and discredit the lab origin theory are disproportionately researchers with vials in their freezers and the funders who supported the creation of those vials. The proponents of GOFROC have demonstrated a callous inability to decenter themselves and maintain objectivity, or otherwise acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative views from scientists outside their dangerous field, and many of us are outside their dangerous field looking on in horror not because we aren’t familiar with the underlying biology or laboratory techniques, but because we are familiar with the biology and have ethical objections to the work they’re conducting.

Yet, these mad scientists with vials have attempted to delegitimize colleagues who don’t play along with their dangerous exhibitionism, as if the only people who can credibly discuss speed limits are those who want to drive dangerously fast. The first claims that a lab origin was a “conspiracy theory” came from researchers who were conducting GOFROC in Wuhan, the funders who funded them, and names I mentioned above who harbor vials in their freezer. Ron Fouchier himself sat in on the fated February 2020 call, alongside Christian Drosten, Anthony Fauci, Francis Collins, and Jeremy Farrar – all gain of function research of concern lobbyists and the funders who sided with them – and together these mad scientists prompted a paper calling lab origin theories of SARS-CoV-2 “implausible”. The plausible lab origin theory stands to ruin their reputations and jeopardize their careers doing and funding unbelievably dangerous work, so they sought to disprove this theory by whatever means necessary, ultimately creating a scientific house of cards that is crumbling.

We need to remember: Ron still holds his vial.

If you need proof that humans aren’t angels, and you aren’t already convinced by the stabber with the pen, the terrorists in trucks and planes, the 2001 person with access to anthrax, the professor who went on a shooting spree, or the professor who pled insanity after stabbing his colleague, then study the self-interested self-preservation of GOFROC researchers as they bend truth and marginalize others to protect access to their vials. These angry scientists have reached a level of depravity in their conduct due to their dependency on dangerous work; they appear like Gollum from the Lord of the Rings protecting “My Precious” with a vicious snarl.

That is who holds the vial that could alter the fate of human history.

DeepAI image generated with prompt: “An angry scientist shouting at the public”

The fame these scientists have received from their scientific exhibitionism, and the consequent platforms they’ve obtained by virtue of their connection with powerful funders whose reputations are also on the line here, must be counterbalanced by a degree of disdain from the rest of us who have received zero benefits from their work. Our lives have not changed at all due to Ron Fouchier’s vial, and the devastating pandemic we recently experienced may well have been caused by a similar vial in Wuhan, perhaps produced out of envy for Ron’s fame due to Ron’s vial. While we receive no benefits from this work, we pay the risk every day we stay up at night terrified of the next pandemic, wondering if Ron Fouchier is angry today.

I know others will agree when I say: I would rather not spend one minute of my life worrying about whether Ron Fouchier is happy or not. I’d rather not have to worry about Ron the same way I like knowing my airline pilot is happy and systems are in place for me to sit back, relax, and enjoy the flight. I trust airline pilots because we have comprehensive systems regulating and overseeing airlines and pilots. I would rather we have a system of laws and regulations in place that allows the rest of us can get on with our lives, assured we won’t be affected by the happiness of unhappiness of Ron Fouchier and other scientists holding vials.

I would rest assured if nobody is allowed to create or access such tools unless elected officials in charge of our national security deem it necessary for national or global security. I would sleep better at night with oversight ensuring not a single drop could be created or leave a lab without authorization and multiple independent observers, if there were transparency ensuring that any pathogen that did emerge from a lab could be immediately, by anyone in the world, traced to the lab, if we didn’t have to look at a pandemic and imagine the contents lurking in lab notebooks the mad scientists refuse to share.

Only then, which such regulations and oversight, would Ron Fouchier know that the risks he’s taking with his vial are not his own. Only then, in a system where he, his university, and his funders are sure to be held liable for damages caused by his research, and assurances in place to guarantee they could cover the damages potentially caused by their work, would our interests be aligned.

Absent those assurances, I stay awake at night, terrified of Ron Fouchier and his vial.